A reappraisal of the EU's expanding readmission system by CASSARINO, Jean-Pierre
A Reappraisal of the EU’s ExpandingReadmission System
Jean-Pierre Cassarino
Readmission is not simply a means of removing undesirable foreigners
through coercive methods. When viewed as a way of ensuring the
temporary stay of foreign workers in the labour markets of European
destination countries, readmission may also impact on the participatory
rights of a growing number of native workers facing equally temporary
(and precarious) labour conditions, in a context marked by employment
deregulation and wage ﬂexibility. These implications have clear democratic
signiﬁcance. A new analytical perspective applied to the expansion and
development of the readmission system, is aimed at promoting a reﬂection
on an unexplored research area bridging the gap between labour migration
regulation and labour market deregulation.
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Readmission pertains to the removal of “persons who do not or no longer fulﬁl the
conditions of entry to, presence in or residence in the requesting state”.1 Readmission
is not a new topic in law,2 history, political science3 or International Relations.4
What is new, however, are the ways in which cooperation on readmission has been
conﬁgured and practiced over the last three decades or so, while gaining tremendous
momentum in bilateral and multilateral talks between European Union (EU)
member states and non-EU countries. It could even be said that readmission has
become a major crossover issue, weaving its way through various bilateral and
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multilateral talks, ranging from the ﬁght against terrorism to energy security,
development aid, social protection and other diplomatic and strategic matters.
A large number of studies have focused on the growing securitisation of migration
management policies in Western Europe to account for the pervasiveness of readmis-
sion in political discourses. This will not be discussed here, nor will the unquestionably
coercive nature of readmission which represents just one aspect of the wider architec-
ture that sustains and consolidates the readmission system in European democracies.
This system has regulatory and disciplinary implications for foreigners and citizens
alike. In a context marked by employment deregulation and wage ﬂexibility, the tem-
porary nature – imposed by readmission – of foreign workers’ stays in the labour
markets of European destination countries also impacts on the participatory rights of a
growing number of native workers facing equally temporary (and precarious) labour
conditions in a context marked by employment deregulation and wage ﬂexibility.
This article is aimed at introducing a new analytical perspective as applied to the
expansion and development of the readmission system. It seeks to promote a reﬂection
on an unexplored research area bridging the gap between labour migration regulation
and labour market deregulation. To do so, this article will not speciﬁcally engage with
the theoretically informed literature on the external dimension of EU Justice and
Home Affairs before or after the Lisbon Treaty. Rather, it takes stock of these scholarly
debates, including those related to other key issue areas, with a view to capturing the
coercive regulatory and disciplinary functions of the EU readmission system. It is
hypothesized here that its current materialisation has implications for migrant workers
and native workers more generally. Whereas the scholarship has started to address the
regulatory function of readmission and its consequences on the social and economic
conditions of migrant workers in industrialised economies,5 the disciplinary function
of the readmission system has been unexplored so far. The disciplinary function refers
to the capacity of the readmission system to contribute to or to feed into the drive for
temporariness in labour market policies. This under-researched function implies a
reconceptualisation which inevitably broadens the analytical spectrum.
The data
Countries of destination, transit and origin often cooperate on readmission by
drafting an agreement. Bilateral agreements may be formalised, as is often the case,
through the conclusion of standard agreements that speciﬁcally deal with readmis-
sion. However, making an inventory of bilateral standard readmission agreements
would never sufﬁce to provide a clear picture of the various cooperative
mechanisms that have been designed to facilitate the removal of unauthorised
aliens. Under certain circumstances, two states may agree to conclude a bilateral
5See for example De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability”. See also Walters, “Deportation,
Expulsion”; and Anderson, “Migration, Immigration Controls”.
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arrangement without necessarily formalising their cooperation on readmission. They
may decide to graft readmission onto a broader framework of bilateral cooperation
(e.g., police cooperation agreements including a clause on readmission, administra-
tive arrangements, and partnership agreements) or to deal with it through other
channels (e.g., by using exchanges of letters or memoranda of understanding).
Part of the rationale behind such non-standard agreements is to respond ﬂexibly
to various contingencies. The unbalanced costs and beneﬁts6 that characterise coop-
eration on readmission have prompted various countries of immigration to opt for
ﬂexible cooperative regimes that do not require lengthy ratiﬁcation processes and
can easily be renegotiated to avoid unilateral defection. Many EU member states,
as well as other countries around the world, have concluded such bilateral non-
standard agreements in order to address re-documentation and the swift delivery of
travel documents or laissez-passers to expel unauthorised aliens.
It is important to adopt a dual approach, encompassing agreements that are both
standard and non-standard, to address properly the unprecedented expansion of the
cobweb of bilateral agreements linked to readmission. At the time of writing (June
2014), the 28 EU member states had concluded more than 300 bilateral
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FIGURE 1. Number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission concluded by EU member
states with non-EU countries, from the EU-12 to EU-28.
Note: The ﬁgure plots standard readmission agreements in light grey and non-standard agreements
linked to readmission in dark grey.
Source: Data collected by the author, RDP © EUI, http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/ra.
6The unbalanced costs and beneﬁts linked with bilateral cooperation on readmission were already addressed
in detail in Cassarino, “Informalising Readmission Agreements”, 182: “While the interest of a destination
country seems obvious (unwanted migrants have to be effectively removed), the interest of a country of ori-
gin may be less evident, above all when considering that its economy remains dependent on the revenues
of its (legal and illegal) expatriates living abroad, or when migration continues to be viewed as a safety valve
to relieve pressure on domestic unemployment.”
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agreements with more than 85 non EU-countries worldwide (see Figure 1). When
the then European Community had 12 member states (1986), around 33 bilateral
agreements existed. When the European Union had 25 member states (2004), the
number of agreements had skyrocketed to 250. This total number slightly declined
in 2007 as a result of the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania (with which
numerous bilateral agreements on readmission had been concluded by the EU-25
member states).7
In previous works,8 the numerous factors shaping patterns of bilateral coopera-
tion were addressed in detail, putting emphasis on the need to consider the above-
mentioned dual approach. This approach is, in fact, crucial to illustrating the full
extent of an expanding web of bilateral agreements. It links together a growing
number of highly diverse countries across all continents (see Figures 2 and 3): rich
and poor, large and small, densely and scarcely populated, geographically close and
distant, democratically governed with respect for human rights and authoritarian
with poor human rights records.
Moreover, the reasons why patterns of cooperation differ markedly were
explained, emphasising the ways in which international state actors codify their
bilateral interactions. Such patterns are linked to complex contingencies that set
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FIGURE 2. Number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission concluded by each non-EU
country with the 28 EU member states (+ Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), June 2014.
Source: Data collected by the author, RDP © EUI, http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/ra.
7The list of standard and non-standard agreements linked to readmission is accessible at http://rsc.eui.eu/
RDP/ra.
8Cassarino, Unbalanced Reciprocities.
A Reappraisal of the EU’s Expanding Readmission System 133
FI
G
U
R
E
3.
C
ob
w
eb
of
bi
la
te
ra
l
ag
re
em
en
ts
lin
ke
d
to
re
ad
m
is
si
on
co
nc
lu
de
d
by
th
e
28
E
U
m
em
be
r
st
at
es
(+
Ic
el
an
d,
N
or
w
ay
an
d
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
)
w
ith
no
n-
E
U
co
un
tr
ie
s,
Ju
ne
20
14
.
N
ot
e:
T
he
bi
gg
er
th
e
ci
rc
le
,
th
e
st
ro
ng
er
th
e
in
vo
lv
em
en
t
of
th
e
co
un
tr
y
in
th
e
co
bw
eb
of
bi
la
te
ra
l
ag
re
em
en
ts
.
D
ar
ke
r
bl
ue
ci
rc
le
s
in
di
ca
te
E
U
m
em
be
r
st
at
es
(+
Ic
el
an
d,
N
or
w
ay
,
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
).
So
ur
ce
:
D
at
a
co
lle
ct
ed
an
d
pr
oc
es
se
d
by
th
e
au
th
or
,
R
D
P
©
E
U
I,
ht
tp
:/
/r
sc
.e
ui
.e
u/
R
D
P/
ra
.
134 J.-P. Cassarino
the boundaries of a domain in which bilateral cooperation on readmission is
possible or foreseeable.
It can be noted that: 1) not all non-EU countries are equally prone to cooperate
on readmission with an EU member state at the bilateral level and 2) the scope of
cooperation is continuously shaped by the combination of four interdependent
drivers. The ﬁrst one has to do with ‘geographic proximity’, whereby two neigh-
bouring countries are expected to have a higher propensity to cooperate with one
another on readmission, owing to frequent cross-border movements. The second
concerns the level of salience that migration and mobility have attained in the rela-
tions between one country and another. This second driver applies particularly to
former European colonial powers which, given the unpopular impact of readmis-
sion on their historical relations with their former colonies, will more often than
not opt for ﬂexible (and less visible) non-standard agreements to ensure a modicum
of cooperation without jeopardising their strategic relations. Cooperation may take
place, while at the same time being shaped by sensitivities around the colonial leg-
acy, and the collective memory of the actors involved. The third driver pertains to
incentives and conditionality. These have been studied extensively by scholars
across various disciplines, with reference to countries in the Western Balkans, the
Caucasus and Eastern Europe, among others.9 These were offered entry quotas for
their nationals, trade concessions, increased development aid, and visa facilitations,
in order to offset the costs of cooperation, and to deter the state in question from
reneging over time. The fourth driver has to do with the positions of relative
power certain non-EU states have attained over time in relation to issues that are
just as strategically important as cooperation on readmission, if not more so. This
noticeable empowerment has been conducive to enhanced regime legitimacy. It has
also had implications for how cooperation on readmission has been conﬁgured,
having a strong bearing on its implementation and scope.
Again, these drivers have been amply discussed elsewhere10 with a view to dem-
onstrating that their combined, not individual, impact has affected the diversity to
be seen in current patterns of cooperation. These drivers jointly delimit a domain
of cooperation that today sustains an expanding readmission system.
The readmission system
Ever since the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which empowered the
European Commission to negotiate and conclude EU readmission agreements
9Among many others, see Trauner and Kruse, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements; Lavenex
and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules beyond EU Borders”; Panizzon, “Readmission Agreements of EU Member
States”.
10Cassarino, Unbalanced Reciprocities.
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(EURAs) with third countries,11 there has been a growing academic literature on
this highly politicised and sensitive issue in the external relations of both the
European Union and its member states. If the reasons why cooperation on read-
mission has become so pervasive in current bilateral talks are to be comprehensively
addressed, the focus must be on the conditions that have contributed to making
cooperation on readmission a key priority.
The readmission system is not only built on obligations arising from interna-
tional customary law, as some lawyers would argue. Nor is it only a system based
on incentives and unequal costs and beneﬁts, as per the tenets of rational choice
theory in International Relations. It is also a system dependent on certain
predominant schemes of understanding, paradigms, and ideas, as well as a
hegemonic lexicon shaping policy perceptions. These factors combine to delimit
the boundaries of a system that is structured against a global (and at times chaotic)
environment.
Undoubtedly, systems provide a “difference”12 for those who belong to them
and adhere (at least in theory) to their codes of conduct, values and visions. Sys-
tems also confer meaning on state actors’ repetitive interactions, even if their inher-
ent meaningfulness does not necessarily equate with effectiveness. The readmission
system is, as John Dryzek et al. would probably argue, a “concourse structure”,
namely “the product of individual subjects, and one that, once created, provides a
context for the further development of their subjectivity”.13 In effect, this system is
also aimed at bestowing plausibility on policy options while seeking consent
through ritual practices and habitual workings.
Recognition of such a system is important insofar as it draws attention to the
need to consider the potential existence of a causal link between beliefs and (per-
ceived) interests, subjectivities and priorities, as well as between values and policy
agendas. In effect, even if cooperation on readmission is based on reciprocal com-
mitments and obligations between countries of origin, on the one hand, and coun-
tries of transit and of destination, on the other, the conclusion of a readmission
agreement is motivated by expected beneﬁts which are unequally perceived by the
contracting parties.14 In other words, its implementation is based on a fragile bal-
ance between the concrete beneﬁts and costs attached to it. Policymakers know
11See Lavenex and Stucky, “Partnering for Migration”; Cassarino, Readmission Policy in the European Union;
Wolff, “The Politics of Negotiating”; Charles, Accords de réadmission; Coleman, European Readmission Pol-
icy; and Peers et al., EU Immigration and Asylum Law.
12Luhmann, “System as Difference”.
13Dryzek et al., “Subject and System in International Interaction”, 502.
14For example, country A may be motivated by the need to “tackle irregular migration” coming from or
transiting through country B and by the desire to reinforce its credibility in migration controls with regard
to its domestic constituency. Concomitantly, country B may be motivated to conclude a bilateral readmis-
sion agreement in exchange for enhanced international regime legitimacy (despite its poor human rights
records) or because it seeks to reinforce at a certain point its leverage on country A with regard to other
key issue areas (e.g. trade concessions, reinforced police cooperation, strategic diplomatic alliances…).
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that reciprocal obligations15 are too asymmetrical to secure the full implementation
of an agreement on readmission in the long run. They also know that grafting
cooperation on readmission onto other issue areas may compensate for the unbal-
anced reciprocities characterising cooperation on readmission. Among others, it is
because of this awareness that the cobweb of readmission agreements has acquired
formidable dimensions over the last two decades or so.
Relative gains-seeking can help explain why two state actors cooperate on
readmission. Such relative gains16 do motivate state actors to cooperate or not.
However, ‘particular systems’ are also shaped by beliefs, ideas and predominant
schemes of understanding that can foster the conditions conducive to cooperation,
and impact on the state actors’ perceptions and behaviour. The readmission system
and its expansion are a case in point.
Viewing the readmission system as a “concourse structure” is essential for investi-
gating the conditions under which readmission has evolved over time and
expanded, despite the asymmetric costs and beneﬁts that characterise cooperation
on readmission. Consequently, one is entitled to consider that the evolution and
expansion of the readmission system have been contingent on the existence of
broader conditions. In turn, these broader conditions have determined new
functions having implications for labour migration and for labour tout court.
The system’s three functions and the emergence of a new migrationlexicon
Bilateral cooperation on readmission (whether based on standard or non-standard
agreements) would never have taken on the spectacular magnitude that it has,
beyond the moorings of national vested interests, had it not been for the emer-
gence of exceptional epistemic conditions. Epistemic conditions pertain to the role
of power in knowledge construction, as it applies to migration, labour and the
meaning of work, in a Foucauldian sense. In other words, the expansion of the
readmission system has also been contingent on overriding circumstances that have,
over the last few decades, modelled the destiny of a growing segment of actors in
all countries of migration. As a prerequisite to further explaining this point, a dis-
tinction has to be made between the coercive, regulatory and disciplinary functions
underpinning the readmission system.
Readmission is coercive because it results from a prescriptive administrative order
forcing a person to act in a speciﬁc way. Coercion has a double-edged effect. On
the one hand, it leads to a sanction that might have severe implications for the
rights and safety of foreign nationals, above all when they are physically removed
to conﬂict-ridden countries or to countries where irregular migration is punished
15Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, 1-27.
16Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”.
A Reappraisal of the EU’s Expanding Readmission System 137
by law. On the other hand, its public manifestation reinforces the credibility of
law-enforcement agencies,17 and by the same token reiﬁes the managerial centrality
of the state with regard to its constituencies. Border controls, the forecasting of
yearly expulsion quotas and the proliferation of detention centres in the territory of
EU member states contribute to making the presence of the sovereign more visible
and powerful in the public eye, above all in times of economic crisis, social discon-
tent and the retrenchment of the welfare state.
Readmission is regulatory because cooperation on readmission is one of the vari-
ous mechanisms geared towards controlling people’s mobility. From the point of
view of ofﬁcials and the expert opinion that they outsource, readmission is cast as
the means to ‘combat illegal migration’, and to ensure the removal of denied
asylum-seekers and unauthorised migrants. It has also been presented and used as
the technical instrument for deterring regular migrant workers from overstaying
their temporary job contracts. This regulatory function has gained momentum over
the last ﬁfteen years. At a bilateral level, countries like France, Italy and Spain have
made the implementation of labour migration recruitment schemes conditional
upon non-EU countries’ reinforced cooperation on readmission with a view to
ensuring the short-term recruitment of foreign labour in their domestic labour mar-
kets.18 For example, this conditionality is enshrined in Spain’s Plán Africa, in
Italy’s bilateral arrangements with some Mediterranean countries, and in France’s
pacts on the joint management of international migration and codevelopment con-
cluded with various African countries.
At EU level, this same conditionality became explicit following the adoption of
the EU’s Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in December 2005, which later
led to the adoption of mobility partnerships.19 The EU’s attempt to conditionally
link mobility partnerships with cooperation on readmission reﬂects how the regula-
tory function of readmission (i.e. ensuring the temporariness of foreign labour) has
become a key component of its migration policy, especially following the adoption
of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum.20 The next section will address
the implications of this form of securitised labour temporariness.
17Campesi, Arab Spring and the European Border Regime.
18Castles, “Guestworkers in Europe”. See also Wihtol de Wenden, La question migratoire au XXIe siècle.
19The Global Approach to Migration (GAM) was renamed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
(GAMM) in late 2011. Mobility partnerships are non-legally binding joint declarations concluded with
non-EU countries. They are based on a three-fold approach to migration: 1) the management of legal
migration, 2) the link between migration and development and 3) the ﬁght against irregular migration
(including cooperation on readmission). See European Commission, On Circular Migration and Mobility
Partnerships. For an analysis of mobility partnerships, see Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, “Mobility Part-
nerships”. See also the recent book edited by Triandafyllidou, Circular Migration between Europe.
20The Pact, sponsored by France and endorsed by the EU member states in October 2008, forms the basis
for immigration and asylum policies common to the EU and its member states. It covers issues ranging
from the organisation of legal immigration to reinforced border controls and the ﬁght against unauthorised
migration. More importantly, it fosters the conclusion of bilateral agreements with non-EU countries deal-
ing with legal and unauthorised migration, as well as with cooperation on readmission.
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Finally, readmission is disciplinary because the expansion of the web of bilateral
agreements on readmission results from the acceptance of enhanced cooperation on
readmission as a necessary evil if European labour markets are to be protected from
‘external threats’, namely unauthorised migration.
This acceptance may in fact stem from the regular and frequent interactions that
have taken place in regional consultative processes (RCPs) on migration manage-
ment, organised by governmental, intergovernmental and international organisa-
tions in all regions of the world from the mid-1990s onwards. Their ofﬁcial
rationale is to promote inter-state dialogue on migration management issues among
representatives of countries of destination, transit and origin. While regular interac-
tions among actors with diverging interests and contingencies are not a novelty in
world politics, RCPs on migration management are quite unique in their capacity
to deﬁne overriding common principles, which become enshrined in what has been
called the “international agenda for migration management”. They have been criti-
cal in leading towards the global acceptance of the international agenda, shaping
the needs and perceptions of various state actors and instilling in the minds of par-
ticipants guiding principles and plausible truths which, in turn, have been elevated
to shared principles and values, setting standards for how human migration should
best be administered, regulated and understood.
The production and reproduction of a hegemonic knowledge capable of shaping
subjectivities and policy options during recurrent bilateral and multilateral migration
talks has gradually created a new migration lexicon conducive to consensus formation
– and to detaching those who repeat (and assimilate) it from their own realities and
vested interests. Consider, for example, ofﬁcials and migration stakeholders in coun-
tries of origin who hail the “effectiveness” of their EU-sponsored temporary migra-
tion programmes, while minimising, if not disregarding, their effects on (low-cost)
migrant workers’ labour conditions and limited economic and social rights in destina-
tion countries. Equally, while certain migrant-aid associations and NGOs point out
failures to observe human rights and to respect internationally recognised standards
relating to labour migration and asylum, others tend to repeat uncritically, in their
own advocacy, the same hegemonic notions and thought categories found elsewhere.
There can be no question that the global expansion of the readmission system is
inseparable from the impact and consolidation of these epistemic conditions. They
have had serious implications with respect to the extent to which migrant workers’
rights and aspirations are respected and in terms of the gradual acceptance of tem-
porariness as the paradigmatic reference point for labour policies. The next section
considers the ﬂipside of these matters.
Time contraction: the common denominator
Today, temporariness and job uncertainty (including precariousness and ﬂexibility),
are the common denominators of the modern working experience for a large
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proportion of workers, both native and immigrant, in all ﬁelds. How signiﬁcant or
relevant are these common denominators to this reﬂection on the readmission
system?
To answer this question, a look has to be taken at the regulatory and disciplinary
functions of the readmission system, as described above, rather than at its coercive
function.
First, it has to be noted that bilateral cooperation on the readmission of aliens
has gained momentum in Western Europe, alongside the implementation of tem-
porary migrant labour programmes. Today, cooperation on readmission between
EU and non-EU countries is presented as a precondition for implementing such
programmes. Arguably, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland have been among the
most proactive European countries in promoting and negotiating such programmes
for conditional and temporary labour migration.
Apart from the possibility of sanctioning over-stayers, these bilateral agreements
tend to favour the short-term stay of migrant workers over their long-term resi-
dence. The political will to ensure the temporariness of labour migrants has a cer-
tain bearing on their access to rights and their own aspirations for stability. It is a
well known fact that time impacts on migrant workers’ experience of migration in
the broadest sense, and particularly on their ability to beneﬁt from rights, and to
be protected from vulnerability and exploitation. A study published in 2011 by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) clearly explained that the more temporary
the employment of migrant workers, the more difﬁcult the realisation of their
social and labour rights in destination countries.21 These include freedom of associ-
ation, unionisation, the right to equal treatment in terms of salary, family allow-
ances, working conditions and hours of work, training and apprenticeship, social
protection and, last but not least, family reuniﬁcation. By law, family reuniﬁcation
is not an option for temporary migrant workers or residents in some Western
European countries (e.g. Switzerland22), or is strictly conditional on prohibitive
accommodation and ﬁnancial prerequisites (e.g. Belgium, France, Norway and the
Netherlands).
In a similar vein, skills acquisition, integration in a company, and employer/
employee relationships are intensely shaped by the temporary duration of a job
contract. A study conducted by the European Migration Network concluded that
if the period of employment of migrant workers is too short – say, two years –
there might be little reward for employers to invest in their training.23 Admittedly,
this holds true for any kind of temporary employment.24 However, when
temporariness is regulated by readmission, it generates a form of containment with
21Wickramasekara, Circular Migration.
22See Observatoire Suisse du Droit d’Asile et des Etrangers, Le Regroupement familial, http://www.odae-ro
mand.ch/IMG/pdf/Rapport_regroupement_familial.pdf.
23European Migration Network, Temporary and Circular Migration, 61.
24Michie and Sheehan, “Labour Market Deregulation”.
140 J.-P. Cassarino
a double-edged effect. On the one hand, employers know that policy discretion,
based on short-term security-oriented concerns, might abruptly jeopardise their
possibility of investing economically in migrant workers’ training. On the other
hand, migrant workers’ aspirations to integrate and socialise in a company are lim-
ited, as are their rights to family reuniﬁcation and professional advancement.
All the abovementioned basic rights, which are comprised in internationally
recognised standards, such as ILO Conventions 97 and 143, have gradually been
eroded. This has led to a “protection gap”25 between internationally recognised
standards applying to migrants, and their effective implementation in destination
countries. At the same time, what makes current temporary migration schemes dif-
ferent from those that were implemented until the late 1970s lies precisely in what
could be described as a process of time contraction, leading inevitably to a certain
containment of rights26 and career development.27
This process of time contraction did not come about overnight. It sprang from a
quest to ﬁnd out why past temporary migration schemes had resulted in the pro-
longed, if not permanent, stay of migrant workers in most European destination
countries.28 The reasons stemmed from a mix of economic and non-economic fac-
tors, as well as from a complex socialisation process, and trust-based relationships
between employers and their foreign employees, making the former more inclined
to renew job contracts with the latter so as to reduce additional recruitment and
training costs. A lot has been written on these factors, which Philip Martin referred
to as “distortion effects”.29 While contributing to migrant workers’ prolonged stay
in European countries, they also, and perhaps more importantly, contributed to
raising migrant workers’ awareness that stable conditions in destination countries
would enhance their opportunities to attain social and economic rights, organise
themselves through collective action, and aspire to advancement, stability in their
lives, and greater participation in local society.
A troubling continuum
The 1973 oil crisis and its effects on employment security, inﬂation and social
cohesion, combined with the ensuing economic downturn of the mid-1980s in
Europe and the neoliberal drive for labour market competitiveness and ﬂexibility,
25This gap is extensively analysed by Cholewinski, “International Labour Law”, 416-21.
26Relatedly, in 2002, Nicholas De Genova introduced the notion of “deportability”, i.e. the possibility of
being deported or expelled as a result of policy discretion which reinforces migrant workers’ vulnerability.
De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability”.
27Castles, “Guestworkers in Europe”.
28Ibid.
29Martin, Managing Labor Migration.
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led to a process of market deregulation.30 In an apparent paradox, this went hand
in hand with the reinforcement of the regulation and control of migration ﬂows,
including restrictive entry and selective recruitment measures addressed to
foreigners.
However, this was not paradoxical at all if we consider that reinforced migration
controls represented, as they still represent today, the most explicit way of visibly
reifying the centrality of the sovereign, in a context marked by industrial delocalisa-
tion, state divestiture, subcontracting, outsourcing, off-shoring, privatisation, occu-
pational risks, weakened social dialogue and, last but not least, the protracted crisis
of European political integration.
There seems to be a troubling continuum between the temporariness of migrant
labour and the temporariness of labour tout court. The exploration of this possible
continuum calls for a new analytical perspective. What makes current temporary
labour migration programmes radically different from their past equivalents is their
more general regulatory and disciplinary effects on a broader segment of society.
Today, these forms of policy discretion not only impact on migrant workers’
opportunities for advancement, labour rights, and socialisation in destination coun-
tries; they also convey a more general, if subtle, message addressed to a growing
cohort of short-term employees, part-timers, interns and trainees, in other words,
the European “precariat”,31 comprehensively analysed by Guy Standing in his book
on the drive for ﬂexibility. Temporary foreign and native workers alike face simliar
forms of social and economic exclusion,32 including uncertainty, growing
instability, low levels of protection, and enhanced exposure to vulnerability, if not
submissiveness.33
This point is essential for appreciating that the oft-cited reference to coercion
can no longer conceal the fact that the readmission system and its current ethos
are today inseparable from the gradual changes in the meaning of ‘work’, ‘participa-
tion’ and access to opportunities over the last few decades. Its contemporary corre-
lates, namely precariousness, insecure career support and development in the ﬁrm,
the porous frontier between leisure and working hours, and more worryingly, the
idea that human skills and resources are interchangeable and disposable at will,
have contributed to making the drive for temporariness a mainstay of contempo-
rary labour market policies. To quote Richard Sennett, this reﬂects a “system
[which] radiates indifference in the organization of absence of trust, where there is
30Crouch, “The Governance of Labour Market Uncertainty”. See also Michie and Sheehan, “Labour Mar-
ket Deregulation”; Letourneux, Precarious Employment and Working Conditions; Rodgers and Rodgers, Pre-
carious Jobs in Labour Market Regulation; and Thornley et al., Globalization and Precarious Production and
Employment.
31Standing, The Precariat.
32Sassen, Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity, 76.
33Schwartz, “Opportunity Costs”.
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no reason to be needed. And it does so through the reengineering of institutions in
which people are treated as disposable.”34
Conclusion
In sum, the above considerations underline the need to further explore the regulatory
and disciplinary functions of the readmission system. This article set out to show that
through a troubling continuum, there seems to be a shared destiny between the
circumscribed rights of temporary migrant workers, and the equally circumscribed
rights of a growing segment of the native labour force in Europe. This “shared narrative
of difﬁculty”35 between two groups that were traditionally considered distinct, if not
actually opposed to one another in the rhetoric of policymakers can no longer be
dismissed offhand. Today, it needs to be tackled and further analysed. Clearly, the
sword of Damocles is not equally threatening for foreign and native workers. However,
the hand that dangles it over their heads may be the same. The issue at stake is not that
the “policies that regulate working conditions for citizens and permanent residents
should apply”36 to temporary migrant workers. Rather, the key issue is that the latter’s
working conditions are permeating the former’s with the drive for temporariness
cutting across the working conditions of both native and migrant workers.
Is not recognition of this shared destiny the key precondition for questioning, in
a sincere and credible manner, the lingering acceptance and worrying banality of
readmission as it currently stands? Is this uncomfortable awareness not the most
daunting challenge to be faced when it comes to recognising the overarching
neoliberal paradigm that sustains this system and instils in the minds of voters the
illusion that the containment of foreign workers’ rights will protect them from the
drive for temporariness and job precariousness?
It is time to readdress the readmission system, but not by focusing exclusively
on its coercive nature or its implications for the safety of aliens in European demo-
cratic regimes. Rather it must be shown that its implications are part of a wider
architecture shaping the destiny of an entire social collective, whether its members
are foreigners or citizens.
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